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ANTICONSUMER EFFECTS OF UNION
MERGERS: AN ANTITRUST SOLUTION
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RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR.tt
INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 1995, three of the largest labor unions in the
United States announced their agreement to merge. Although
unions have been merging in recent years with increasing frequen-
cy,' the combination of the United Auto Workers, United
Steelworkers, and International Association of Machinists is un-
precedented.' It is in many respects the labor equivalent of a cor-
porate merger between every major United States auto manufac-
turer, steel producer, and airplane assembler. It might be part of
an attempt by organized labor to recapture its declining monopoly
power.
t Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
tt Professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Washington, and Ad-
junct Professor, University of Washington School of Law. This Article builds on our
earlier work Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits, 28 J.L. & ECON. 297
(1985), and More Lessons from Japan: End Industrywide Collective Bargaining?, 4 ASIAN
ECON. J. 28 (1990). We wish to thank Jon Brock and Barbara Ann White for helpful
suggestions and comments, and Robert J. Feldman and Diane Larson for editing and
research assistance.
1. "As recently as the 1970s there were 129 unions in the AFL-CIO; with this
merger there would be fewer than 80." Frank Swoboda, Leaders of 3 Large U.S. Labor
Unions Agree to Merger, WASH. POST, July 27, 1995, at Al. In the 28 years between
1956 and 1984 there were 92 union mergers. See John L. Conant & David L. Kaserman,
Union Merger Incentives and Pecuniary Externalities, 10 J. LAB. RES. 243, 243 (1989).
That number represents a significant increase from earlier periods-56 union mergers oc-
curred between 1890 and 1935; 35 occurred between 1936 and 1955. See id.
2. The resulting union will be the largest in North America, with 2 million active
and 1.4 million retired members. See Frank Swoboda, 3 Merging Unions Invite Others to
Join, WASH. POST., July 28, 1995, at C2. The three unions are expected to be fully
merged by the year 2000. See id.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 196-207.
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Large corporate mergers are, of course, scrutinized under the
antitrust laws. The relevant corporate merger statute blocks those
mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly,, 4 and permits those likely to be
benign, procompetitive, or proconsumer.5
Collective bargaining, by contrast, enjoys a broad exemption
from the antitrust laws. If they follow appropriate procedures,6
unions-even unions that, when taken together, cover all workers
within a given industry-are permitted to merge or to coordinate
their activity.7 There is no review of such mergers or coordinated
activity to determine whether monopoly power or other anticom-
petitive or anticonsumer activity will result.'
This Article asks whether mergers between labor unions
should be examined under a standard similar to that used to scru-
tinize corporate mergers' and outlines an alternative proposal that
4. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 1-3 (1992).
6. For some of these necessary procedures, as well as complications accompanying
union mergers, see GIDEON CH1TAYAT, TRADE UNION MERGERS AND LABOR CON-
GLOMERATES 136-38 (1979). Chitayat provides useful examples of mergers that have oc-
curred despite these procedures and complications. See id.
7. Unions sometimes bargain together as a formal unit, and sometimes coordinate
their bargaining informally. Formal bargaining that involves more than one employer,
however, can occur only under limited circumstances; multi-employer bargaining does
occur in the construction trades and took place for a long time in the unionized coal
industry. Industry-wide bargaining occurs routinely in some industries, while in others it
never occurs. In the auto industry, one union bargains with each employer separately; the
first contract sets the pace for the others. These characterizations of union bargaining are
based on a discussion with Jon Brock of the University of Washington Graduate School
of Public Affairs on Nov. 13, 1996. For a more complete discussion of industry-wide and
multi-employer bargaining, see infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
8. In considering this antitrust exemption from an economic viewpoint, it is impor-
tant to note that public regulation of labor and management relations takes place in a
highly-charged political and emotional atmosphere. See generally FOSTER RHEA DULLEs
& MELVYN DuBOFSKY, LABOR IN AMERICA (4th ed. 1984) (describing the contentious
history of labor law from Colonial America to the present). Yet, basic principles of eco-
nomics can be applied in the formulation of public policy involving unions and collective
bargaining, just as these principles have been applied in policy-making elsewhere. See
infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
9. The question itself is likely to be extremely controversial. For example, then
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland argued that federal labor law as it stands gives work-
ers insufficient protection. See Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL.CIO Chief Calls
Labor Laws A 'Dead Letter', WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8. Kirkland stated that
workers might be "better off with the law of the jungle," and that the AFL-CIO would
"seriously consider" the option of repealing "all but the earliest and most basic rights"
unions secured decades ago. Id. The one labor law Kirkland singled out as desirable was
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allows workers within individual companies to form a union or
otherwise coordinate their bargaining, but then subjects all pro-
posed mergers or other alliances of these units to the merger
provisions of the antitrust laws."
We begin by determining the primary goals of the labor ex-
emption to the antitrust laws. We find that Congress, when enact-
ing the exemption," was primarily concerned with protecting the
rights of workers, who were perceived as being in an inferior
bargaining position relative to their employers.' This concern for
an equality of bargaining positions seems to evince a desire to
prevent opportunistic employers or employers with monopsony
power over their employees from unfairly exploiting their work-
ers.
13
We take Congress' concerns as a given and demonstrate that
Congress could substantially have reached its primary goal in a
better way. Congress and the Supreme Court chose to protect
workers by allowing all of the workers in an industry to join to-
gether and bargain as a unit. 4 This solution protects workers
from exploitation and promotes those efficiencies associated with
unionization. 5 But it also permits unions to acquire monopoly
power and creates a strong likelihood of anticompetitive behav-
ior. 6
organized labor's antitrust immunity. See id.
10. Throughout this Article we assume that if two unions cannot merge they also
cannot conspire to fix wages, strike, etc., in accordance with "normal" antitrust principles
prohibiting concerted anticompetitive action. For a survey of these principles, see ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (2d ed. 1984). We do not suggest
that antitrust law be used to eliminate workers' ability to bargain collectively with man-
agement. That is, agreements among workers to seek certain wages, hours and working
conditions should not be antitrust violations.
11. Courts also played a role in the recognition of this exemption. See infra notes
27-33 and accompanying text.
12. Congress was concerned, to a lesser extent, with issues of efficiency. See infra
note 36 and accompanying text.
13. For an economic definition of exploitation in this context, see infra notes 73-85
and accompanying text.
14. We believe Congress and the Court acted as they did in an atmosphere of in-
tense struggle between labor and capital, rather than in an environment conducive to
producing the most socially desirable result. See infra notes 37, 50-51.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 62-69.
16. A potential imbalance of bargaining power is created by allowing all workers in
an industry to bargain as a unit while employers must bargain as individuals. The courts
corrected this imbalance by allowing affected employers to bargain as a unit in opposi-
tion to such alliances of workers. See infra notes 104-06. This solution, however, encour-
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The untried, alternative approach would have been to permit
workers within a firm to unionize or bargain as a unit,17 but to
allow the resulting unions to merge only to the extent permitted
by the analogous corporate merger laws. Under such an approach,
unions would also be prevented from coordinating their behavior
in accordance with normal corporate antitrust principles. 8 This
solution might very well reduce the monopoly aspects and anti-
competitive and anticonsumer behavior of unions without signifi-
cantly sacrificing their protective and efficiency-enhancing aspects.
This Article focuses upon some of the implications and practical
consequences that could arise from this alternative policy.
As an instructive comparison, this Article also briefly analyzes
the Japanese collective bargaining system and contrasts it to rel-
evant aspects of the United States' system. We examine the Japa-
nese system's strengths and weaknesses, and ask whether certain
restrictions on union mergers might move the collective bargaining
system in the United States closer to the Japanese system in a
way that mirrors the latter system's strengths but not its weakness-
es.
The purpose of this Article is not necessarily to develop a
politically realistic alternative. Nor is it to examine every feature
of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. We will not, for ex-
ample, examine such important questions as how to decide what
constitutes a labor union. Instead, we focus on union mergers and
how to maximize consumer welfare within the constraints imposed
by social policy.
ages rent-seeking behavior by both unions and firms. See infra notes 105-06, 108-10.
17. A firm-wide union preserves workers' rents but does not significantly restrain
trade. See infra notes 74-85. Even though a union may have a monopoly over its
workers' services, the existence of firm-wide unions should not be considered a violation
of the antitrust laws.
18. This approach is similar to earlier proposals in certain respects. See, e.g., H.
Gregg Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Problem: A Positive Program, 59 J. POL. ECON. 277,
278 (1951) (arguing that the size of collective bargaining units should be limited to indi-
vidual enterprises or employers, with collusion among them being unlawful); Bernard D.
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
659, 713 (1965) (suggesting that the Sherman Act should be applied to direct union re-
straints on prices, production, and product sales, but not to collective bargaining over
wages, hours, work loads, and work sharing). Many examinations of the area conclude
that the current approach is generally justified. See e.g, RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMEs
L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do? 246-51 (1984); see also sources cited infra notes
79-83.
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I. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Although there are hundreds of pages of labor statutes that
one could consider as support for the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws,' 9 the core of the exemption arises from three stat-
utes: the Sherman Act,2° the Clayton Act,2' and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.22 As the Supreme Court has observed, these laws
are "interlacing statutes" that must be read together to understand
the labor exemption properly.'
A. Congressional Goals Underlying the Exemption
The Sherman Act forbids every "contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade," and does not contain an express
exception for labor unions.24 Although there is relatively little
discussion of the matter in the legislative record, there is some
reason to believe that the Act's framers may not have meant to
extend coverage to unions.' Nevertheless, a number of early
Sherman Act prosecutions were brought against labor unions. 6
19. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994), is a
crucially important labor law statute.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1994) (original version at ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1994) (original version at ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994) (original version at ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932)).
23. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). Numerous judicial decisions have analyzed the history of the
conflict between labor and antitrust. See, e.g., id. at 801-10; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 486-513 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-31 (1941).
These three cases firmly established collective bargaining's general exemption from the
antitrust laws. A more recent synopsis can be found in Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-26 (1975). The best articles in this
area include: Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor
Unions For Anticompetitive Litigation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 757 (1992); Symposium: The
Application of Antitrust Laws to Labor-Related Activities, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 331 (1983).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
25. See 51 CONG. REc. 13,662-64 (1914) (summarizing debate over passage of the
Sherman Act); see also EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 11-51
(1930) (arguing that Congress intended the Act to militate against trusts, not unions).
During Congressional debate on the Clayton Act, Senator Henry Ashurst noted additional
Sherman Act debates on point. See CONG. REC., supra, at 13,662-64. On March 24, 1890,
Senator John Sherman, after whom the Act was named, had stated that "the combina-
tions of workingmen to promote their interests, promote their welfare, and increase their
pay if you please, to get their fair share in the division of production, are not affected in
the slightest degree, nor can they be included in the words or intent of the bill as now
reported." 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890).
26. In fact, more early Sherman Act suits were filed against labor unions than
against corporations. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The courts seemed to encourage these prosecutions. The Su-
preme Court held that labor unions were not automatically exempt
from the Sherman Act,27 although the Court never clarified pre-
cisely how the Sherman Act would affect unions. Courts had held
that union activity could violate the Sherman Act.28 Further,
since one could consider the very existence of a significant union a
conspiracy in restraint of trade,29 the union members reasonably
feared that the Sherman Act might be used to dissolve their un-
ions, and even to jail union officials when the unions engaged in
collective bargaining, striking, or picketing."
These fears reflect the fundamental reasons why Congress
included a labor exemption in the Clayton Act: without a specific
exemption the courts might render unions ineffective,31 the union
or its members might be prosecuted under the Sherman Act, or
the Sherman Act might be used to dissolve unions.32 For these
reasons, unions were able to persuade Congress to include a provi-
Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 31 (1963). In
1914 Senator Ashurst stated that he knew of 101 Sherman Act proceedings against farm-
ers and labor organizations. See 51 CONG. REc. 13,848 (1914); see also Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1908) (stating that labor unions are not exempt from the Sherman
Act and citing several cases involving suits against labor unions pursued under the Act).
27. See Loewe, 208 U.S. at 301. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919,
950-58 (1988).
28. See Loewe, 208 U.S. at 301-04; Vandell v. United States, 6 F.2d 188, 190 (2nd
Cir. 1925); United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698, 705-06 (N.D. Cal. 1895).
29. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 932-35, 950-58.
30. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 8-12 (Charles J. Morris ed., 2d ed. 1983)
(explaining that the Sherman Act's substantive provisions were broadly interpreted to
apply to labor unions); 51 CONG. REc. 13,663 (1914) (statement of Sen. Ashurst). The
Democratic platform in 1908, reprinted in 1912, declared that "there should be no abridg-
ment of the right of wage earners and producers to organize for the protection of wages
and the improvement of labor conditions to the end that such labor organizations and
their members should not be regarded as illegal combinations in restraint of trade." 51
CONG. REQr 13,847 (1914) (remarks of Sen. William Thompson). President Wilson, in a
speech accepting the 1912 Democratic presidential nomination, stated:
No law that safeguards . . . [workers' livesI that improves the physical and
moral conditions under which they live, that makes their ... hours of labor
rational and tolerable, that gives them freedom to act in their own interests,
and that protects them where they can not protect themselves can properly be
regarded as class legislation or as anything but a measure taken in the interest
of the whole people, whose partnership in right action we are trying to estab-
lish and make real and practical.
51 CONG. REc. 13,847 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Thompson, quoting President Wilson).
31. For a discussion involving several congressmen of different perspectives, see 51
CONG. REC 14,587-91 (1914). See also H.R. REP. NO. 627, at 14-16 (1914).
32. See sources cited supra note 26.
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sion in the Clayton Act declaring that human labor was not an
item of commerce and was thus outside the coverage of the anti-
trust laws?
3
The debates in Congress over the passage of the Clayton Act
also explain why Congress thought it important that unions be
allowed to exist. Congress' primary reason for passing the labor
exemption was to attempt to protect workers from the results of
their inability to negotiate as equals with corporations. 4 This pro-
tection primarily consisted of protecting workers from earning less
than they were "entitled" as a "fair" return on their labor." Eco-
nomic efficiency also appears to have been a concern of Con-
gress. 6 One important goal of the exemption was preventing la-
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
34. See id. Labor asserted that the Sherman Act was not originally meant to apply
to labor unions but that the courts had misinterpreted it. See 51 CONG. Rnc. 9551 (1914)
(quoting Labor's Position on the Antitrust Law, ORGANIZED LABOR, May 23, 1914); see
also 51 CONG. REC. 13,662-64 (1914) (stating that the legislative history of the Sherman
Antitrust Act reveals a congressional intent to exempt labor organizations from its provi-
sions).
35. 51 CONG. REc. 9552 (1914) (quoting Labor's Position On the Antitrust Law,
ORGANIZED LABOR, May 23, 1914).
[Labor unions] are formed to prevent the lowering of wages even more than to
further the raising of wages. That the unions seek a labor monopoly in restraint
of trade is not true. Their end is not a monopoly of work, but proper pay for
the work the workers perform-what labor organization aims at and what com-
binations and trusts aim at are entirely different things. The one seeks only to
see that the laborer gets his proper hire. The other seeks to gouge labor of its
share of what it produces.
Id. Senator Ashurst noted:
The individual employee is frequently unable to insist upon the "square
deal"; ... unless he acts in concert with his brother employees. In many in-
stances the power of the employer to withhold a subsistence is a more effective
weapon than the power of the employee to refuse to labor. Under such circum-
stances the law of "supply and demand" doctrine as applied to labor should
really be called "despotism in contract."
Id. at 13,667; see also id. at 9086 (remarks of Rep. Melville Kelly) (claiming that workers
should be able to act "together for the protection of their rights and interests").
36. Of course, strikes can be harmful to the economy as a whole. However, the
record reveals only scattered direct references to the concept of efficiency. See e.g., 51
CONG. REc. 13,668 (1914).
It should come as no surprise that Congress was interested in more than economic
efficiency. George Stigler noted that economists frequently waste their time analyzing
legislation solely in terms of economic efficiency even though politicians who pass legisla-
tion almost always care primarily about transferring wealth to or from certain groups.
Stigler cited rent control and tariffs as areas where real world public policy decisions
have little to do with efficiency considerations. In each case, legislation is enacted be-
cause an interest group perceives (often mistakenly) that the legislation will benefit it.
See George J. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, REGULATION, May/June 1982, at 13.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:197
bor-management violence and insuring the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes through collective bargaining; this has clear effi-
ciency implications. 7 Other concerns included the desire to pro-
tect workers' freedom of contract, to protect workers from arbi-
trary employer activity, and to preserve social stability. 8 But far
and away the central concern of Congress was to equalize
workers' bargaining position so that they could earn a "fair"
wage.
39
We are unable to determine whether labor supporters be-
lieved that corporate stockholders would absorb all of the costs of
these higher wages, or whether labor supporters realized that the
exemption might cause higher prices for consumers.4" And, al-
For applications of this argument to antitrust, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As
The Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82-93 (1982); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Con-
siderations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL L. REV. 1580, 1588-93 (1983); see also Alan
A. Fisher & Richard Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement
Policy, 6 REs. L. & ECON. 1, 7-10 (1984) (providing economic criticisms of legislative,
judicial and executive policy towards vertical mergers).
37. For examples of labor-management violence, see the facts underlying Apex Ho-
siery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 480-83 (1940) and United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 227-28 (1941). As the Supreme Court stated in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB:
[T]he object of this Act was ... to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic
theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, argu-
ments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open
discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.
397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
38. See id.; see also 51 CONG. REC. 13,662 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Ashurst) (main-
taining that the integrity of the democratic system depends on the right to organize); 51
CONG. REc. 9086 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Kelly) (blaming social unrest upon the lack of
worker bargaining power).
39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
40. In the Sherman Act debates Senator Stewart made one interesting statement in
this regard:
[S]uppose that capital should combine against labor, as it is very much inclined
to do, and there should be a combination among the laborers which would
increase the cost of production and increase the cost of all articles consumed.
Suppose there should be a combination among the laborers to protect them-
selves from grasping monopolies; they would all be criminals for doing it.
21 CONG. REC. 2606 (1890). Senator Ashurst, however, stated:
It has been asserted that it is dangerous for laborers to possess the power to
compel a compliance with their demands for a living wage. I reply that such
power is indeed dangerous-to monopoly, oppression, tyranny, avarice, and
greed-but is wholesome to the general welfare and to public tranquillity. In-
ternal dangers to a State need never be apprehended from a general desire and
effort on the part of the creators of wealth to promote their own efficiency,
improve and exalt their own station ....
51 CONG. REc. 13,668 (1914).
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though legislators denounced monopolistic corporations on the
same pages of the Congressional Record on which they cried for
protection of workers,4' there did not appear to be any cry that
workers should capture their "fair" share of such firms' monopoly
profits. We also found no discussion of the possibility of allowing
the workers of each company to form labor unions but subjecting
them to the merger and other antitrust laws.
For a variety of reasons, the Clayton Act's labor exemption
did not accomplish its primary goals. The Act's provisions at least
established the nominal right of workers to form unions.42 The
Supreme Court, however, declined to interpret the Clayton Act in
a manner that gave the unions effective bargaining power, or to
create as broad an exemption as the unions desired.43 The nomi-
nal right of workers to form unions was often practically meaning-
less.44
Also, largely due to the Depression,45 by 1932 the plight of
workers was more grave than in 1914.46 The unions persuaded
Congress to pass the Norris-LaGuardia Act,47 whose purpose was
largely to overturn unfavorable Court decisions and give labor
broad, effective antitrust protection.48 It reiterated and strength-
41. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC., at 9086 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Kelly).
42. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 17, 52; see also infra note 44 (describing the ineffectiveness of
worker rights established by the Clayton Act).
43. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 468-77 (1921); Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 50-52 (1927). These
decisions prevented unions from engaging in secondary boycotts against dealers who sold
goods produced by non-union labor. The Court limited the antitrust protection accorded
"labor disputes" to disputes between employees and employers over wages and benefits,
thereby excluding secondary boycotts from the exemption.
44. One way that employers avoided union organization was to require all employees
to sign "yellow dog" contracts, pledging that the employee would not join a union, or, if
already a member, would quit. See S. REP. No. 72-163, at 14-16 (1932) [hereinafter SEN-
ATE REPORT]. Further, the courts issued at least one injunction forbidding unions from
publicizing the facts involved in their strikes or aiding striking workers. See id. at 17.
Some of these decisions also held labor leaders personally liable for damages caused by
the illegal acts of striking workers. See id.
45. In 1932, it was the depression, not the lack of an effective antitrust exemption,
that caused significant hardship for workers. In this context, it is not surprising that Con-
gress decided to exempt labor from the antitrust laws. As when it passed the National
Recovery Act, the Depression-era Congress might have been willing to permit monopoly
capitalism. See DULLEs & DUBOFSKY, supra note 8, at 250-254.
46. In 1914 there were 3,120,000 unemployed workers as compared to 12,060,000
unemployed workers in 1932. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 126 (1975).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994) (original version at ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932)).
48. The report accompanying the House version of the Act stated:
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ened the fundamental principle that a labor union or a strike
could not constitute an illegal combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade.49 And, although the Act significantly changed the
legal standards governing the labor exemption, the economic ratio-
nale underlying it in the debates seemed to be very similar to that
underlying the corresponding portions of the Clayton Act. The
major theme of promoting bargaining equality between labor and
capital pervaded Congress' deliberations 0 and the Act's pream-
ble.5 The other themes of 1914 also seem to have been pres-
It is easy to say that an employee is not compelled to accept employment and
that an employer has the right to make such conditions as he may see fit sur-
rounding the employment. But, aside from... materially diminishing [an
employee's] freedom of contract, the vice of such ["yellow dog"] contracts,
which are becoming alarmingly widespread, is that if they are carried to their
ultimate conclusion, they would abolish trade-unionism.
H.R. REP. No. 72-669, at 7 (1932). The Report also quoted the Supreme Court for the
view that if such contracts were enforced, "collective action would be a mockery." Id.
(quoting Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
570 (1930)).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 105. It also outlawed "yellow dog" contracts, id. § 103, enumer-
ated a lengthy list of common union practices that were made no longer subject to re-
straining orders or injunctions, id. § 104, added procedural safeguards, id. § 107, and
immunized labor leaders from responsibility for illegal acts by union members, except
upon "clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts," id.
§ 106.
50. The Senate Report stated:
[G]overmmental grants of authority to form corporations . . . [ensure that] thou-
sands of owners of property are enabled to combine hundreds of millions of
dollars of capital and, in this way, substantially to control and sometimes to
monopolize opportunities for employment. Such a power, unrestrained by the
organization of labor, would permit employers arbitrarily to fix the wages and
conditions of labor under which millions of men and women would find their
only opportunity to earn a living.
A single laborer, standing alone, confronted with such far-reaching, over-
whelming concentration of employer power, and compelled to labor for the
support of himself and family, is absolutely helpless to negotiate or to exert any
influence over the fixing of his wages or the hours and conditions of his la-
bor .... If he can exercise no control over his conditions of employment, he
is subjected to involuntary servitude.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 9.
51. The declaration of public policy in the Preamble to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
states:
[T]he individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual lib-
erty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore ... it is necessary
that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such rep-
resentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
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ent,2 but the concern with bargaining inequality was of primary
importance, as many of the leading Supreme Court interpretations
of this Act have recognized.53
B. Multi-Union, Multi-Employer, and Industry-wide Collective Bar-
gaining
Once organized labor secured an effective exemption from the
antitrust laws, the issue of union mergers and alliances inevitably
arose, because unions, like workers, increase their bargaining
strength by acting together. Moreover, when separate unions face
all their employers in one bargaining session, they save the trans-
action costs of multiple negotiations and ensure equality of com-
pensation and working conditions.' In time, multi-employer bar-
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
52. See id. The Report that accompanied the Senate version of the Act mentioned as
goals "that freedom of association, self-organization and mutual help and protection which
all of us want to make secure," SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 8, and "the redress
of grievances and ... peace rather than strife," id. at 10 (quoting Texas & New Orleans
R.R., 281 U.S. at 570).
53. The Court noted in United States v. Hutcheson that the exemption "'was designed
to equalize before the law the position of workingmen and employer as industrial com-
batants."' 312 U.S. 219, 229 (1941) (quoting with approval Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 484 (1921)). Congress was interested in "protecting and favoring
labor organizations and eliminating the competition of employers and employees based on
labor conditions regarded as substandard, through the establishment of industry-wide
standards." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n.23 (1940).
Interestingly, Justice Holmes wrote in Vegelahn v. Guntner that:
Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other
is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a
fair and equal way ...
If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view, among other
things, to getting as much as they can for their labor, just as capital may com-
bine with a view to getting the greatest possible return, it must be true that
when combined they have the same liberty that combined capital has to support
their interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of those
advantages which they otherwise lawfully control.
44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (dissenting opinion).
54. Multi-employer or industry-wide collective bargaining can be carried out in any of
a number of ways: unions may merely share information and goals, they may "coordi-
nate" bargaining, or they may formally impose procedure which obligate the unions to
agree to identical terms. Some of these activities would be legal if performed by corpora-
tions; others could constitute horizontal price fixing which would violate the Sherman
Act.
It is often in the interests of some or all of the employers in an industry to bar-
gain collectively; it at least allows them to offset organized labor's bargaining strength.
Further, employers are often less concerned with absolute wage and benefit levels than
with ensuring that they do not pay more for labor than do their competitors. Thus, de-
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gaining units were also found exempt from the Sherman Act.
The origin of the labor exemption which permits multi-em-
ployer bargaining is obscure;5 no statute explicitly permits it. In
1935, however, Congress passed the Wagner Act5 6 to further
strengthen the rights of workers to organize, bargain collectively,
and engage in concerted activity.' This Act also established an
administrative agency-the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB)-with exclusive jurisdiction over allegedly unfair labor
practices. 8 Although no law expressly authorizes the NLRB to
certify multi-employer bargaining units, and although multi-em-
ployer bargaining units were not uncommon before the NLRB was
created in 1935,59 a 1940 Supreme Court decision construed the
Act as empowering the board to certify multi-employer
bargaining.' Thus, the exemption appears judicially created.61
pending upon the conditions in an industry, multi-employer bargaining is often believed
to be desirable both by unions and by management. It is also possible that all of the
workers and employers could get together to form a cartel and divide its monopoly prof-
its, or for rent-seeking purposes generally.
55. The legislative histories of the statutes that granted the exemption plainly and
repeatedly state that Congress passed them for the benefit of employees, not employers.
See supra notes 35-37, 40. The statutes themselves also embody a preoccupation with the
rights of labor unions and virtually ignore the rights of employers. However, section 6 of
the Clayton Act does declare that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994). Arguably this definition excludes joint em-
ployer activity concerning wages from the antitrust laws. A few legislators also expressed
the view that the Clayton Act exemption would apply to both employers and employees.
See, eg., 51 CONG. REc. 14,333 (1914) (statement of Sen. Charles Thomas); 51 CONG.
REC. 14,366 (1914) (statement of Sen. Hoke Smith); 51 CONG. REC. 16,279 (1914) (state-
ment of Rep. Edwin Webb); see Leonard L. Scheinholtz & Kenneth C. Kettering, Ex-
emption Under the Antitrust Laws for Joint Employer Activity, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 347,
351-52 (1983) (noting several general references in the floor debates to legislators' views
that the Act also applies to employers).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1994).
57. Section 7 of this Act originally provided: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." National Labor Rela-
tions Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935).
58. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 30, at 28.
59. See supra note 55. Moreover, multi-employer bargaining units predated the
Sherman Act. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 30, at 473.
60. See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940); see also In re Waterfront Employ-
ers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80, 110-11 (1946). It has been observed that:
The Board noted that Section 9(b) provided for 'employer' units, that Section
2(2) defined 'employer' to include any 'person' acting in an employer's interest,
and that Section 2(1) defined 'person' to include 'associations.' Therefore, the
Act contemplated that an employer unit could consist of an association acting
in the employer's interest, i.e., a multi-employer unit.
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The exemption provides that employers may combine to op-
pose workers' collective wage demands, but only within the con-
text of collective bargaining.6' Further, the scope of the multi-
employer bargaining unit can be no wider than the scope of the
collective bargaining unit that it forms to oppose.' Collective
bargaining involving more than one employer and more than one
local union must be agreed to by every participating union and
employer before it will be certified by the NLRB.64 Thus, the
idea of multi-employer bargaining seems to be based upon the
notion of countervailing power.'
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 30, at 474-75; see also PHILLIP AREEDA & DON-
ALD F. TURNER, 1 ANTTRUST LAW 198-202 (1978).
61. The Supreme Court has approved the existence of multi-employer bargaining
units on several occasions. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union 449, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 89-90 (1957) [hereinafter Buffalo Linen]; NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S.
404, 409-10 (1982). Further, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664
(1965), the Court noted that "the law contemplates agreements on wages not only be-
tween individual employers and a union but agreements between the union and employ-
ers in a multi-employer bargaining unit." See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 287 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters & Butcher workmen, Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
712-14 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Scheinholtz & Kettering, supra note 55, at
355-57; Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1020-22
(1986).
62. See William C. Zifchak, Labor-Antitrust Principles Applicable to Joint Labor-Man-
agement Conduct, 21 Duo. L. REV. 365, 370-72 (1983).
63. Scheinholtz & Kettering, supra note 55, at 357; see also AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 60, at 200 (emphasizing equality of bargaining power, suggesting that immuni-
ty should attach "regardless of the dimensions of the formal bargaining unit, for an em-
ployer combination that is no broader than the union" and noting that the exemption
includes protection for joint lockouts of striking workers). During the 1940s many propos-
als to limit multi-employer bargaining were introduced into Congress, including some by
business organizations. One of the most sweeping proposals was sponsored by the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 30, at
475. None were enacted. See id. "In NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, the Supreme
Court reviewed the failure of legislative efforts to curb such bargaining and concluded
that Congress intended the Board to 'continue its established administrative practice of
certifying multi-employer units."' Id. (citations omitted). Today, multi-employer bargaining
is relatively common, and complex NLRB procedures govern their formation and dissolu-
tion. See iL at 476-87. A crucial question which we have not yet been able to answer is
whether the NLRB could refuse to certify multi-employer bargaining units with larger
than specified market shares.
64. Unions that do not belong to a certified multi-employer bargaining unit can still
informally coordinate their bargaining.
65. This countervailing power approach appeals to our sense of equity, but is never-
theless inefficient. It allows labor and capital to combine at the expense of consumers,
who are not represented at the bargaining table. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
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In summary, the reasons that labor supporters advanced in
favor of the original labor exemption from the antitrust laws were
quite modest. When viewed historically, their agenda seems readily
understandable. Without the minimum guaranteed right to form
effective unions, the bargaining position of workers was believed
to be drastically inferior to that of their employers. The courts
(and perhaps Congress) later ratified union mergers, coordinated
union activity, and multi-employer bargaining.66 Congress' prima-
ry goal in passing the labor exemption was to achieve equality in
bargaining.67 We found no significant evidence that Congress in-
tended to promote labor interests at the expense of consumers.68
The monopoly aspects of unions were largely unforeseen and
unintended by Congress in 1890, 1914 and 1932.69
Given this historical background, it is not surprising that there
was little or no attention given to the possibility that there might
be ways to secure equality for workers with fewer undesirable side
effects on the efficiency of the economy as a whole.70 One comes
away with the impression that Congress saw the choice as either
exempting unions from the antitrust laws almost completely,71 or
66. Given that Congress was attempting to establish a broad antitrust exemption for
labor, it would have been difficult for them to deny all the workers in an industry the
right to bargain collectively. With workers having this right, management could be expect-
ed also to want the right to bargain collectively. Since formalized multi-employer bargain-
ing has always been consensual, perhaps both labor and management saw it as a tool,
which they were not required to use, and which could sometimes work to their advan-
tage.
67. We are cautioned in our conclusion, however, by the wisdom expressed in FELIX
FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 145 (1930): "With a legis-
lative history like that which surroufids [the labor exemption from] the Clayton Act, talk
about the legislative intent as a means of construing legislation is simply repeating an
empty formula. The Supreme Court had to find meaning where Congress had done its
best to conceal meaning."
68. It is difficult to imagine labor supporters engaged in congressional debate publicly
calling for unions effectively to acquire economic surplus from consumers, or for such
common labor goals as featherbedding or retarding the spread of new technology. Never-
theless, early labor advocates must have had at least an inkling of some of the major
inefficiency consequences of the exemption. As Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene
noted in The Labor Injunction, "[t]he truth to be dealt with is that every measure upon
which a labor union relies for acceptance of its demands, involves the curtailment of
some temporal interest of employer, non-union employee, and frequently the public." Id.
at 24.
69. For a contrary view, see generally Campbell, supra note 61, at 1047-58.
70. And, of course, economic conditions have changed dramatically in the last half-
century. Measures that might well have been proper in 1914 or 1932 could easily have a
new set of effects today.
71. The labor exemption to the antitrust laws is not absolute. For example, if a
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not achieving anything close to equality of bargaining power. The
notion of, for example, imposing market share restraints on unions
would perhaps have been a more finely tuned approach than
could have been expected at the time.
II. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF EXEMPTING UNION MERGERS
FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
We now consider unions' actual ability to merge, coordinate
behavior, and engage in industry-wide collective bargaining. We
analyze these effects of this behavior initially with respect to
Congress' primary goal-protecting workers' rents72 from acquisi-
tion by monopsonistic or opportunistic employers-and examine
the efficiency-creating aspects of this protection. We then examine
some of the other, probably unintended, economic effects of the
labor exemption from the antitrust laws generally and from the
merger laws particularly, and we describe the rent-seeking behav-
ior and economic inefficiency that they permit.
union and a group of employers combine to fix prices or divide territories, such activity
is generally held to be outside the scope of the exemption. See Local 167, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 297 (1934). See also Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
808-10 (1945) (holding, in part, that a union and employers cannot enter into a conspira-
cy with manufacturers to give employers a monopoly in the industry and the union a
monopoly of the workers).
72. For a definition of "rent" see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 9 (2d ed. 1977). In economics, "rent" is identified with producer surplus. Producer
surplus is the amount that can be taken as a lump sum from a producer without affect-
ing the level of production. Less technically, it is approximately the same as economic
profit. For example, imagine that one owned a spring that produced water with unique
properties whose only costs of production were those of bottling and transporting the
water. Assume that water from this spring sells at a very high price. If the government
were to tax water from this spring, this would lower net income but not the amount of
water sold. The government would have extracted some of its rent.
In short, rent-seeking is simply the attempt to extract a supranormal profit (a rent)
without producing any more. Resources devoted to rent-seeking are a social loss since
they do not contribute to greater production.
Another definition of "rent-seeking" comes from Roger Miller and Raymond Fishe:
"An attempt to secure monopoly profits by investing resources to influence public poli-
cy." RoGER LEROY MILLER & RAYMOND P.H. FIsHE, MICROECONOMICS: PRICE THEO-
RY IN PRACTICE 430 (1995).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
A. Protection of Workers' Rents and Enhancement of Economic
Efficiency
A policy consistent with the maximization of societal welfare
would certainly encourage, or at least not be inimical to, the for-
mation of unions in some form7 3 Unions may arise as a mecha-
nism to reduce contract costs where the firm or the employee
invests in specific human capital. In the absence of unions, both
employer and employee have an incentive to extract rents oppor-
tunistically: having incurred training costs, the party that bore
these costs may not have an efficient mechanism for recovering
them.74 The worker trained at company expense may go to an-
other company, or the company may offer the worker, trained at
the worker's own expense in areas specific to the employer, less-
than-promised wages. In general the union may be able to supply
credibility and ensure the performance of long-term contracts by
preventing individual workers from acting opportunistically. 5 At
the same time, the union provides a credible threat (it can strike)
against companies that attempt opportunistic behavior.76
It is important to note that the positive effect of unionization
on productivity is observed even considering the higher wages that
unionization causes.77 Part of the union/non-union differential in
productivity seems to be due to striking differences in quit rates?
-the quit rate is much lower at unionized companies, a fact con-
sistent with the notion that unions supply the credibility to ensure
73. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Com-
petitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315 (1978).
74. This explanation implies that unions are more likely to exist when the opportu-
nistic cheating problem is greater. See id. at 316. This implication has not, however, been
systematically tested.
75. Consistent with this explanation are data showing that quit rates are substantially
lower for union workers as compared with non-union workers when wages and other
factors are held constant. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Collec-
tive Bargaining: Can the New Facts Be Explained By Monopoly Unionism?, in RESEARCH
IN LABOR ECONOMICS 293 (Joseph D. Reid, Jr. ed., 1983).
76. See generally id. (considering the non-wage effects of unions). In manufacturing
and construction (and, at one time, underground bituminous coal mining), unionized firms
appear to have greater productivity than non-union firms, other things being equal. See
id at 305.
77. That is, the higher productivity remains after the effect of capital-labor ratios and
higher quality labor for unionized firms are taken into account. See id. at 304, 306.
78. See id. at 302; see also Richard B. Freeman, The Effect of Unionism on Worker
Attachment to Firms, 1 J. LAB. RES. 29, 30, 48-49 (1980) (stating that trade unionism is
associated with significantly lower probabilities of separation).
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long-term contract fulfillment. The research suggests that the re-
duction of turnover among unionized employees is not primarily
due to monopoly wages, reduction in employer-initiated separa-
tions, or unionization of more stable workers. Rather, it seems to
stem from changes in worker attitudes and behavior arising from
the union setting.79
These are not the only efficiencies that are likely to be caused
by unions." Unions provide management with valuable informa-
tion and advice. Management can attempt, through the union, to
discuss and implement workplace improvements in order to pre-
vent workers from quitting.8 Richard Freeman and James
79. In the cement industry, a significant portion of the union/non-union productivity
differential arises because the quality of management is higher in union than in non-un-
ion firms. One possibility is that the union is an efficient means of communicating medi-
an employee preferences to management. An alternative hypothesis would be that firms
with better management tend to become unionized. If management is collecting short-
term rents, the formation of a union may preserve these rents for workers. This would
not, however, explain a persistent association of unions with better management. See
Freeman & Medoff, supra note 75, at 304; Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The
Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INTEREST 69, 80-82 (1979); Kim B. Clark, The Impact
of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study, 33 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 451, 451-69
(1980); Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Productivity: Micro-Econometric Evidence, 95 Q.J.
ECON. 613, 636-38 (1980).
80. The existence of unions also appears to serve the end of some people's sense of
distributive justice. A series of studies finds that unions in part act to reduce wage differ-
ences. Strong unions apparently cross-subsidize lower-paid workers, and wage inequality is
much lower among unionized workers than among comparable non-unionized workers.
Wage differentials among workers who differ in race, service, skill level, and education
(but not sex) are less in union than in non-union firms. Finally, seniority, independent of
productivity, is more important in promotion decisions at unionized companies then at
otherwise comparable non-unionized companies. See generally Freeman and Medoff, supra
note 75.
Freeman also contends that unions reduce income inequality. See Richard B. Free-
man, Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 23 (1980);
see also FREEMAN AND MEDOFF, supra note 18, at 20. The authors suggest that unions
increase inequality among blue-collar workers due to the greater wages of blue-collar
union workers, but that unions reduce inequality among union workers and between the
blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. See id. They argue that these latter equali-
ty-enhancing effects are greater than the inequality effect. See id. However, one reason
we do not find this argument convincing is that, in spite of their claims, Freeman and
Medoff did not compare the difference in inequality between the situation in which un-
ions exist and one in which unions do not exist.
81. Unions can often help resolve legitimate worker grievances and protect workers
from arbitrary corporate action in ways that cost the firm little or nothing. Unions can
also help convince workers of the sincerity of management initiatives that are in fact in
everyone's best interest. Thus, unions can serve to make the labor market more efficient
by acting as a coordinating mechanism for labor and employer interests.
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Medoff have explained why public goods aspects of an effective
workplace "voice" require collective worker action,' and note
other benefits from having a collective worker voice. 3
Thus, there is theory and evidence to suggest that unions can
efficiently supply workers with information on public goods in the
workplace. Unions can also efficiently deter firms' and employees'
rent-seeking behavior. A policy consistent with efficiency would
encourage unions, in some form, to competitively supply those
services.' If this was their only effect, profit-maximizing firms
82. Freeman and Medoff point out that many important aspects of an industrial set-
ting are "public goods" with high costs of exclusion. Safety conditions, lighting, heating,
pollution levels, the comfort of the work place, the speed of the production line, the
grievance procedure, the speed of the production line, and promotion affect the entire
work force. "Without a collective organization, the incentive for the individual to take
into account the effects of his or her actions on others, or to express his or her prefer-
ences, or to invest time and money in changing conditions, is likely to be too smail to
spur action." FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 18, at 9. This public goods character of
worker-supplied information is another reason, in addition to that advanced by Klein et
al., see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text, why it is efficient for unions to exist in
some form.
Freeman and Kleiner have found that union organizing in the 1980s had little ef-
fect on union wages but considerable effect on giving members a greater voice through
improved grievance procedures, seniority protection, and job posting and bidding. They
conclude that the gain in "collective voice" rather than the gain in monopoly power ex-
plains the motivation for new unionization during this period. See Richard B. Freeman &
Morris M. Kleiner, The Impact of New Unionism on Wages and Working Conditions, 8 J.
LAB. ECON. S8, S9, S24, S25 (1990).
83.
The collective nature of trade unionism fundamentally alters the operation of a
labor market and, hence, the nature of the labor contract. In a nonunion set-
ting, where exit-and-entry is the predominant form of adjustment, the signals
and incentives to firms depend on the preferences of the "marginal" worker,
the one who might leave because of (or be attracted by) small changes in the
conditions of employment. The firm responds primarily to the needs of this
marginal worker, who is generally young and marketable; the firm can to a
considerable extent ignore the preferences of typically older, less marketable
workers, who-for reasons of skill, knowledge, rights that cannot be readily
transferred to other enterprises, as well as because of other costs associated
with changing firms-are effectively immobile. In a unionized setting, by con-
trast, the union takes account of all workers in determining its demands at the
bargaining table, so that the desires of workers who are highly unlikely to leave
the enterprise are also represented. With respect to public goods at the
workplace, the union can add up members' preferences in much the same man-
ner as a government can add up voters' preferences for defense, police protec-
tion, and the like to determine social demand for them.
FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 18, at 9-10.
This is a simply another expression of the Klein, Crawford and Alchein argument,
.supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Unions ensure greater weight for the prefer-
ences of senior workers and thus increase the younger workers' incentive to invest id job-
specific training and stay.
84. The return to unions would be equal to the cost of supplying those services. The
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would welcome unions. The fact that they do not is consistent
with the existence of union monopoly power.
Much of the theory and evidence demonstrating the efficien-
cies that can arise from unions is new and controversial. For pur-
poses of this Article, however, we will accept these efficiencies as
both real and empirically significant. Even assuming all of these
efficiencies from unionization do commonly arise, however, the
critical question for this paper is whether large union mergers,
coordination among large unions, and industry-wide collective
bargaining are required to produce these benefits."
B. Rent-Seeking Behavior and Economic Inefficiency
1. Monopoly Aspects of the Exemption. We have found no
evidence that the existence of monopoly power by unions is
necessary for, or even related to, those aspects of unions that pro-
mote efficiency. Moreover, no one has suggested a mechanism
through which such a relation would exist. We will proceed under
the assumption that the efficiency aspects of unions exist
separately from any monopoly power of unions.86
There is surprisingly little accurate information on the type,
extent or magnitude of those effects of unions associated solely
with their monopoly power. There are hundreds of studies of the
relative effects of unions that have appeared since H.G. Lewis'
classic study of 1963, including a newer survey by Lewis in
unions that more efficiently supplied those services would drive out less efficient unions.
85. Gideon Chitayat, in his comprehensive study of union mergers, concludes that
national unions with fewer than 50,000 members might be too small and inefficient to
survive, but does not address the question of when significant economies of scale dimin-
ish or disappear, or whether unions might become too large to be efficient. See
CHTrAYAT, supra note 6, at 131. Chitayat also documents a trend towards larger labor
unions. See id. at 139.
86. Authors who emphasize the positive contributions of unions do not deny their
monopoly aspects. For example, Freeman and Medoff note:
As monopoly institutions, unions reduce society's output in three ways. First,
union-won wage increases cause a misallocation of resources by inducing orga-
nized firms to hire fewer workers, to use more capital per worker, and to hire
workers of higher quality than is socially optimal. Second, strikes called to force
management to accept union demands reduce gross national product. Third,
union contract provisions-such as limits on the loads that can be handled by
workers, restrictions on tasks performed, and featherbedding-lower the produc-
tivity of labor and capital.
FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 18, at 14.
87. H. GREGG LEWIS, UNIONISM AND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNIED STATES:
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY (1963).
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1986.88 Lewis finds that these studies show an average union/non-
union wage differential of about 15%, although he believes this
estimate has an upward bias. 9 These studies, however, provide
an estimate of the wage gain from unionization relative to the
nonexistence of unions only if the supply curve of non-union labor
is completely elastic or is unaffected by unionization." This as-
sumption is generally untrue; it cannot be true for the economy as
a whole when the economy is near full employment since new
workers can only be enticed into the labor market by higher wag-
es.9' In addition, there is almost no data that might be used to
measure the monopoly power of unions, and no estimates of that
part of the wage gap or gain that is due to monopoly power.
92
Thus, we know neither the wage effects of unions (compared to
not having a union), nor the wage effects of union monopoly
power.
Nevertheless, striking evidence of the influence of monopoly
power on union wages is found in the pattern of union/non-union
wage differentials as it varies with the unions' jurisdiction. One
would expect, as somewhat casual empirical evidence suggests, that
the wage gap depends crucially on the ability of unions to extend
their coverage to all firms in a particular market.93 A characteris-
88. H. GREGG LEWIS, UNION RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS: A SURVEY 174-87 (1986).
Other more recent studies include Farrell E. Bloch and Mark S. Kuskin, Wage Determi-
nation in the Union and Non Union Sectors, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., 183 (1978);
Wesley Mellow, Employer Size, Unionism and Wages, in RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOM-
ics 253-82 (Supp. 2, Joseph D. Reid ed., 1983); John Raisian, Union Dues and Wage
Premiums, 4 J. LAB. RES. 1 (1983).
There is considerable evidence that foreign competition has significantly reduced
union monopoly power. Freeman and Kleiner find that new unionization in the 1980s
produced wage and benefit gains far below those implied by the standard earlier cross
sectional studies of union wage effects. See Freeman & Kleiner, supra note 82, at S9. In-
stead, newly organized workers made gains primarily in the areas of grievance proce-
dures, job posting and bidding, and seniority protection, although there were some wage
gains as well. See id. Freeman and Kleiner do suggest, however, that these limited wage
effects may be temporary and may end with the period of union formation and "first-
contract" effects. See id.
89. See LEWIS, supra note 88, at 186-87.
90. See Mellow, supra note 88, at 260-61, 276.
91. See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMrrIH, MODERN LABOR
ECONOMICS 26-29 (2d ed. 1985).
92. One reason for this could be the absence of proposals such as ours to motivate
such an analysis.
93. That is, a key variable is the cost to the unions to organize and extend their
jurisdiction and control. See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS AND
LABOR RELATIONS 435-38 (1984).
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tic of unions that are relatively successful, such as miners, truckers,
longshoremen, and construction workers, is that there are distinct
geographic limits to the relevant product markets. 94
Mergers are a powerful means of gaining the requisite cover-
age. John Conant and David Kaserman note that "union mergers
play a role similar to the monopolization role of corporate merg-
ers."95 This monopolization motive is recognized by union lead-
ers; the director of collective bargaining for an international union
stated in an interview that "[b]argaining power may increase if a
union is able to gain a greater monopoly advantage." 96
To maximize net rents, unions need to control quantities as
well as prices of both inputs and outputs. In addition, part of
union rents will be reflected in working conditions as well as wag-
es. For both these reasons, the choice of inputs and working con-
ditions will be affected by the existence of unions with monopoly
power. Thus, restrictive work practices and featherbedding are
associated with unions.97 There is widespread agreement that such
restrictive practices impose a substantial social cost. Albert Rees
estimates that this cost is probably larger than the welfare losses
associated with the relative wage effect.98
One estimate of the economic inefficiency caused by unions'
wage effects is approximately $5-10 billion per year.99 This esti-
94. The teamsters gain leverage through control of terminal facilities in a few major
cities. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 130 (1994). Construction sites and mines are immobile. Deregulation
reduces the control of unions by increasing organizing and policing costs, and thereby
reduces the wage gap. The antipathy of unions to deregulation is well-known. See gen-
erally RONALD G. EHRENBERG, THE REGULATORY PROCESS AND LABOR EARNINGS
(1979) (detailing labor costs in regulated industries).
95. Conant & Kaserman, supra note 1, at 245.
96. Kay Statton-Devine, Union Merger Benefits: An Empirical Analysis, 13 J. LAB.
RES. 136-37 (1992).
97. For an economic analysis, see Paul Weinstein, The Featherbedding Problem, 54
AM. ECON. REV. 145, 145-52 (1964). Restrictive work practices are also associated with
non-union workers. See generally STANLEY B. MATHEWSON, RESTRICTION OF OUTPUT
AMONG UNUNIONZED WORKERS (1931).
98. See Albert Rees, The Effect of Unions on Resource Allocation, 6 J.L. & ECON.
69, 72-73 (1963).
99. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 18, at 57. This estimate of the deadweight
loss from the union wage effect is probably too high. The true estimate might be only
approximately one-third of their estimate, for several reasons. First, their estimate of the
wage effect of unions is based on the union/non-union differential when the relevant
figure is the union wage compared with the wage in the absence of unions. See supra
notes 80-83 and accompanying text. More importantly, their estimate is based on partial
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mate implies a transfer of wealth from shareholders and consum-
ers to union members of about ten times this amount.' ° Perhaps
the most striking feature of these estimates is that they were made
by economists relatively sympathetic to organized labor.
The surprising fact is that no one has estimated generally the
effect of unions' monopoly power (as opposed to the effect of
their efficiency-creating aspects) on wages.'0' There are no good
estimates separating the monopoly effects of unions' on wages
equilibrium assumptions that are clearly inappropriate. Neither income nor cross-effects
are taken into account. Lee Edlefson provides a method of doing this and finds that
general equilibrium calculations of the deadweight loss for typical simulation of parame-
ters usually is a fraction of the loss calculated by partial equilibrium analysis. See RICH-
ARD 0. ZERBE, JR. & DxvIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS: IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 480-84 (1994).
100. See id. at 236-47. We believe that this estimate is conservative. Even if the elas-
ticity of demand for labor is close to one, the welfare loss calculated by Freeman and
Medoff suggests a transfer of wealth from shareholders and consumers of about ten times
this amount. With an elasticity of one and a wage increase from the competitive wage of
15%, the decrease in the quantity of union labor would also be about 15%. The dead-
weight welfare loss can be approximated by multiplying one half of the wage increase by
the number of workers losing jobs as a result of union monopoly wage increases. That is,
Welfare Loss = % x .15W x .15L, where W is the wage of workers before monopoly and
L is the number of workers before monopoly. The ratio of union workers remaining to
those no longer working as union workers would be then 85 to 15. The size of the
transfer will be found, approximately, by multiplying the size of the wage increase by the
number of workers working after the wage increase. That is, Transfer = .15W x .85L.
The ratio of the transfer to the welfare loss then is .85 to .075, or about 11 to 1.
101. It is still an open question whether unions have an optimal effect on wages after
the productivity-enhancing effects of a union are accounted for. The most sensible posi-
tion seems to be that the positive effects on productivity are less than the total wage ef-
fects. This is the only position consistent with the recent finding that in unionized firms
the profit per unit of capital is lower, ceteris paribus, than in non-unionized firms. See
John Barton & Gordon Tullock, Concluding Comments, in RESEARCH IN LABOR EcO-
NOMICS 347 Supp. 2 (Joseph D. Reid, Jr. ed., 1983).
102. The returns to union monopoly will be greater if the union, in addition to con-
trolling the supply of labor, is able to control the price, quality, and quantity of other in-
puts and of outputs. However, such control is often illegal and as a practical matter
virtually impossible. Without it, as unions raise their wages, employers adjust their utiliza-
tion of all inputs and output margins, thereby in part frustrating union attempts to maxi-
mize the benefits that they achieve for their members. This result can be inferred from
FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS: BusINESS AND
LABOR PRACTICES 122-25 (1978).
Complete control over all inputs and outputs could have positive efficiency effects
as well as maximizing a union's total rents (or wages). Whenever two stages in a produc-
tion setting are subject to separate monopoly powers, output is over-restricted, leading to
a double-monopoly loss. Ownership of both stages, or decision-making by one party,
however, would enable those involved to internalize the separate effects of monopoly
power at both stages and thereby increase overall efficiency. For a thorough discussion,
see Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 36, at 14-15, 109. However, this efficiency is a "second
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from the efficiency effects."
The monopoly aspects of unionism are somewhat counterbal-
anced by the existence of multi-employer bargaining,"°4 which
has complex effects that can benefit either employers or unions,
depending on the circumstances, and that may add to the harm to
consumers.
105
The formation of a multi-employer bargaining unit largely
replaces a labor monopolist bargaining arrangement with bilateral
monopoly. A multi-employer unit may use its additional power to
resist union demands. Since, however, employers are much more
concerned with their costs relative to one another, and since multi-
employer bargaining strikingly reduces the elasticity of labor de-
mand as compared with single firm bargaining, it seems possible
or even likely that multi-employer bargaining would lead to in-
creased wages. This is in fact the result indicated by the empirical
evidence for multi-employee bargaining units operating in the
local, as opposed to the national, labor markets.16
best" solution; a preferable solution in terms of global efficiency would be to eliminate
the monopoly power at both stages.
103. Indeed, as far as we can determine, no concentration ratios or Herfindahl indices
have been calculated for unions. We have calculated a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for
unions at the industry 2-digit level. Even for such gross market definitions the index is
above the 1,800 level (listed in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, as
the point of "high" concentration) and is higher than many corporate 4-digit industry
concentration levels within the same 2-digit classification. See Calculations for Unions at
the Industry 2-Digit Level (on file with author).
104. Legal decisions in this area, however, generally have been more favorable to
employers than to unions. For example, courts have uniformly held that employers may
jointly lock out employees if threatened with a "whipsaw" strike, even if they are not
members of the same multi-employer bargaining unit. See Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298, 1310-12 (E.D. Wash. 1981); Newspaper Drivers &
Handlers' Local 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159, 1161 (6th Cir. 1968); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1979).
See also Scheinholtz & Kettering, supra note 55, at 358-59 (stating the same proposition).
Mutual lockout pacts by employers have also generally been upheld. See id. at 359. Final-
ly, the courts have upheld at least one insurance pact, under which non-struck firms
agreed to cover fixed costs for struck firms. See Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d
366, 372 (2d Cir. 1963).
105. On some occasions the monopoly aspects serve to reduce unions' transaction
costs of bargaining with employers. In many relatively atomistic industries, unions prefer
to participate in one large proceeding, rather then in hundreds of negotiations. Further,
unions may prefer uniform wages across an industry, even if they are able to price dis-
criminate and secure higher wages for some workers, because of the internal tension such
a practice would create.
106. See, e.g., Peter Feuille et al., Wage and Non-wage Outcomes in Collective Bar-
gaining: Determinants and Tradeoffs, 2 J. LAB. REs. 39, 50 (1981); Wallace E. Hendricks
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Although multi-employer bargaining units can reduce the
magnitude of the monopoly rents acquired by unions, they also
increase the potential for rent-seeking by unions and employ-
ers,107 as the next section illustrates.
2. Rent-Seeking by Unions and Employers. An emerging
literature forcefully argues that the problem of rent-seeking by
raising competitors' costs"08 is an important, widespread and
& Lawrence M. Kahn, The Demand for Labor Market Structure: An Economic Approach,
2 1. LAB. ECON. 412, 416-17 (1984); Wallace E. Hendricks, Labor Market Structure and
Union Wage Levels, 13 ECON. INQUIRY 401, 413-15 (1975).
The tendency toward multi-employer bargaining is reduced to the extent that there
are different unions at different companies in the industry. See D.R. Deaton & P.B.
Beaumont, The Determinants of Bargaining Structure: Some Large Scale Survey Evidence
for Britain, 18 BRrr. J. INDUS. REL. 201, 209 (1990); Wallace E. Hendricks & Lawrence
M. Kahn, The Determinants of Bargaining Structure in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 35
INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 181, 190-91 (1982) [hereinafter Hendricks & Kahn, Determi-
namnts] (concluding that "interunion rivalry appears to increase the perceived labor return
to single-employer as opposed to multiemployer agreements"); Thomas A. Kochan &
Richard N. Block, An Inter-Industry Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes: Preliminary Evi-
dence from Two-Digit Industries, 91 QJ. ECON. 431, 442-45 (1977).
Multi-employer bargaining can also reduce negotiation costs. This use is consistent
with findings that such bargaining is more likely in industries with a relatively large num-
ber of firms, each with a relatively small plant size. Multi-employer bargaining is also
more likely where labor constitutes a relatively large proportion of total costs, a fact con-
sistent with the use of multi-employer bargaining to escape a competitive disadvantage.
See Deaton & Beaumont, supra, at 207; Hendricks & Kahn, Determinants, supra, at 194.
107. Judge Ruggero Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit noted that "[t]hose of us who are active in this field know ... that ninety-five
percent of antitrust law is judge-made law, and that the same is true of our national
labor law . . . [W]hat we are talking about today is . . . federal common law." Remarks
of the Honorable Ruggero L Aldisert, 21 Duo. L. Rv. 337, 339 (1983).
108. That cost-increasing rent-seeking may be common should come as no surprise.
The gains from raising a rival's costs are immediate; there is no sacrifice of short-run
profits for longer-term gains. Nor is it necessary, as in price-cutting, to entirely drive out
a rival for some exit of the rival to occur. The rival's response to increased costs is to
decrease output, allowing some combination of a higher price and an increased market
share for the firm initiating the cost increase. Finally, cost-increasing strategies do not
require a deep pocket or superior access to financial resources. Steven Salop and David
Scheffman have shown that a sufficient condition for a cost-increasing strategy to be prof-
itable is that the price increase by more than the increase in the average costs of the
dominant firm. This increases the dominant firm's profits even if the firm does not adjust
outputs in response to the increased costs. This can be expressed as a condition in terms
of the dominant firm's market share of the elasticity of the fringe supply and the market
demand elasticity. The cost-raising strategy is more likely to be profitable the more elas-
tic the fringe supply, the more inelastic the market demand, and the greater the domi-
nant firm's market share. For mathematical proof of this proposition, see Steven C. Salop
& David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (1983).
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costly phenomenon."e Unions, sometimes in conjunction with
employers, often engage in this sort of rent-seeking behavior."'
Several cases illustrate the importance of the problem and
indicate the difficult legal distinctions involved. Unions' use of
wages and rent-seeking behavior is most clearly illustrated in Unit-
ed Mine Workers v. Pennington."' In that case, the trustees of
the United Mine Workers Union Welfare and Retirement Fund
sued a small coal company, Phillips, for failure to live up to a bar-
gaining agreement. Phillips cross-claimed, alleging that in violation
of the Sherman Act the United Mine Workers, the trustees of the
fund, and certain large coal operators had conspired to raise the
costs of smaller firms that were not members of the bargaining
unit. The allegations were that the union had entered into an
illegal agreement with coal mine operators and that as a result
wages were set higher than some firms could pay."2
The circumstances of the Pennington case may have involved
rent-seeking in which larger firms attempted differentially to raise
the costs of smaller firms." Because the smaller firms were
109. The seminal article is by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 3 (1971). A classic vehicle for rent-seeking is govern-
ment regulation. Changes in costs or in output characteristics differentially affect the
average cost of firms. Government regulations primarily affect costs, thus affecting firms
differently. Moreover, firms differ in their access to~political influence. In general, politi-
cal efforts to acquire or prevent regulations are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. See James
D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries
of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 66-68 (1985). Hence, the battle to acquire or prevent regula-
tion is a primary source of rent-seeking behavior.
110. The economic literature, to a greater extent than the legal literature, has paid
inadequate attention to this sort of rent-seeking. The existence of rent-seeking behavior
in explaining regulations does not mean that public interest elements are not also in-
volved. Other things being equal, the greater the net social rent (i.e., the greater the effi-
ciency gain in the Kaldor-Hicks sense), the greater the potential benefits to politicians
who deliver these gains. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 394-95 (1983); Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr.
& Nicole Urban, Including the Public Interest in Theories of Regulation, 11 RES. L. &
ECON. 1, 3-4 (1988).
111. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also Oliver Williamson, Wage Rates As A Barrier to
Entry: The Pennington Case In Perspective, 82 Q.J. ECON. 85 (1968).
112. Phillips also alleged that the unions and the larger companies agreed to approach
the Secretary of Labor jointly to obtain a minimum wage for companies selling to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and that such a provision would-make it difficult for
smaller companies to compete in the TVA. The court dismissed this charge as inconsis-
tent with precedent that efforts to influence public officials usually cannot violate the
antitrust laws regardless of intent. See Hurwitz, supra note 109, at 80.
113. See Wiliiamson, supra note 111, at 113.
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more labor-intensive than the larger coal firms, wage increases
disproportionately increased the wage bills of the smaller firms
and harmed them in relation to larger firms. The union gained
higher wages at the expense of lower employment, a result consis-
tent with abundant evidence showing that the interests of senior
members of the UMW dominated that union's decision making.
Thus, Pennington demonstrates how a union could use any matter
properly a subject of bargaining which affected one firm more
than another to raise the costs of some firms in comparison with
those of rivals.
The use of nonwage aspects in rent-seeking arose in Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen Local 189 v. Jewel
Tea Co."4 and in Adams Dairy Company v. St. Louis Dairy
Company.115 Jewel, operated in Chicago, introduced prepackaged
self-service marketing of meat beginning in 1948. By 1957, Jewel
had developed a chain of 196 stores, 174 of which provided this
special service. Multi-employer multi-union negotiations in 1957
resulted in a provision stating that "market operating hours shall
be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Monday through Saturday inclusive.
No customer shall be served who comes into the market before or
after the hours set forth above.""1
6
Jewel objected to this provision and sought to have it elimi-
nated as a violation of the antitrust laws." 7 Convenience in
shopping hours is an extremely important aspect of quality in the
retail grocery market, and the restriction on marketing hours un-
questionably would have reduced Jewel's ability to compete by
offering more convenient hours. Rivals of Jewel not offering these
convenient hours clearly would have gained from the restriction.
However, the court found the hours provision to be a legitimate
subject for collective bargaining and therefore exempt from the
antitrust laws."'
In Adams Dairy the union and the industry legally conspired
to raise the costs of a more efficient industry member (even
though the targeted firm's employees were also union mem-
bers)."9 Adams had introduced milk in paper cartons for sale in
114. 381 U.S. at 676.
115. 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
116. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679-80.
117. See id. at 681.
118. See idt at 682.
119. See 260 F.2d at 48-49.
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grocery stores in St. Louis and sold its milk for less than the price
of home-delivered milk.'O Prior to the entry of Adams, retail
sales of milk in grocery stores had been small in comparison with
sales of home-delivered milk. Typical delivery costs were a sub-
stantial fraction of the delivered price.' Adams' innovation re-
duced costs of milk delivery and reduced the labor required for
delivery. Unfortunately for Adams, the new 1950 contract in-
creased by 100% the commission paid to drivers on routes with
more than a specified' number of delivery points." Adams was
the only dairy with routes made up of more than the specified
number of delivery points," so the new union contract had the
effect of substantially raising Adams' cost of doing business. Ad-
ams unsuccessfully brought suit for damages under the Sherman
Act.' 24
Although the current policy promotes industry-wide collective
bargaining and may allow the industry and union to gain at the
expense of the public, it may also harm the union and the indus-
try. A compelling example of this is furnished by the cement in-
dustry. Management in this industry yielded to demands of a
strong union, the Cement, Lime, Gypsum, and Allied Workers
Union (CLGWU), on the grounds that since all domestic competi-
tors were similarly situated, none would be unduly hurt." The
union won high wages and benefits and imposed highly restrictive
work rules. However, foreign competition, substitution of capital
120. See id. at 49.
121. See id
122. In addition, any driver whose route was split was to receive full base pay, plus
average commissions equal to his monthly earnings just prior to the split, for a period of
four months following the splitting of routes. See id. at 50.
123. Because Adams' drivers made milk deliveries to supermarkets, Adams' 12 routes
averaged more than 55,000 points per month. Assuming all of Adams' routes contributed
above 40,000 points, the extra cost to Adams was $43,200 per year in 1950 dollars. See
id.
Adams' response was to hire 10 new trucks and drivers and split the routes, which,
of course, meant lower salaries to the previous drivers. Four years later, at the end of
the contract, Adams was using 34 routes to handle deliveries, compared to 12 originally.
See id. at 49-50.
124. The union may have been predating against parts of itself: there was some indi-
cation that the motivation of the original union was jealousy at the high wages of the
Adams' drivers by other union members. See icL at 50-51. A significant portion of labor
law may be viewed as attempting to prevent waste resulting from one union or part of a
union from rent-seeking at the expense of another.
125. See Herbert R. Northrup, From Union Hegemony to Union Disintegration: Collec-
tive Bargaining in Cement and Related Industries, 10 J. LAB. REs. 337, 350-51 (1989).
1996]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
for labor, and environmental regulations weakened both the union
and domestic cement companies.'6 Small companies could not
afford automation and disappeared.'" Union membership de-
clined from about 43,000 employees in 1950 to about 20,000 em-
ployees in 1988," the companies suffered increasing hardship,
and the union found it could no longer sustain strikes.129 A
merger did not prevent the breakup of the union;130 today its
replacements are weak.'
3. Inadequacies of the Current Exemption. In cases such as
Pennington, Jewel Tea and Adams Dairy, the courts usually re-
quire a finding of a conspiracy with a non-exempt group, such as
employers, and a finding of adverse effects on some other entity,
usually another employer, before denying an antitrust exemption
to a union. Although this proof seems straightforward,
1 33
such proof requires delineating a number of subtle distinctions
before the courts will find an antitrust violation.'"
To determine if a union-employer conspiracy in violation of
the antitrust laws has been formed, courts will examine whether
the subject at issue was a "mandatory" subject of bargain-
ing-wages, hours or working conditions.35 For example, a cru-
cial issue in Jewel Tea was "whether the marketing-hours re-
striction, like wages, and unlike prices, [was] so intimately related
to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful
attempt to obtain that provision ... falls within the protection of
the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the
126. See iL at 375-76.
127. See id. at 354-55.
128. See id. at 355 tbl.2.
129. See id. at 365-67.
130. See id. at 369-71.
131. See id. at 372-73.
132. See ABA ANTrrRusT SEcrION, supra note 10, at 625 (discussing Pennington and
Jewel Tea).
133. However, the Connell case muddied the law. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local Union 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); discussion infra note 142.
134. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806-13 (1945); Lumber Prod. Ass'n. v. United States, 144 F.2d
546, 550-52 (1944), rev'd sub nom. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 410-13 (1947); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 501-07, 512-13 (1940).
135. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3), 159(a)
(1994) (defining "mandatory").
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Sherman Act.' 3 6 The exemption protects restraints that operate
directly on the labor market but does not cover product or busi-
ness market restraints that only affect the labor market indirect-
ly. 137
Courts also examine whether a employer had the union agree-
ment thrust on it, or whether it actively sought the agreement. On
remand in Pennington, the district court required proof of a "con-
spiracy between employers and labor formed with the intention of
driving competition out of business"'38 and found no such
proof. 39 In Adams Dairy the court required a finding of
anticompetitive intent on the part of both the union and the con-
spiring employers to invoke antitrust liability. The agreement ulti-
mately survived antitrust scrutiny because the court decided that at
least some of Adams' rival employers had resisted the proposal
that adversely affected only Adams.
Because the current legal doctrine is likely to only catch
grossly foolish rent-seeking unions and employers, these distinc-
tions have proven difficult for the courts.' 4 In Pennington and
Jewel Tea, for example, the court split into three groups of three
Justices. 14' The foregoing distinctions, difficult as they may be,
were in some respects blurred further-and judicial review made
more difficult-by the Connell decision in 1975.142 As a result,
136. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965).
137. The legality of multi-employer bargaining also depends crucially on one's notion
of what is the national labor policy. One can read Justice White in Pennington as saying
that national labor policy is whatever is in the best interest of unions. But he goes on to
say that the union was not acting in its own interest in giving up its ability to bargain
flexibly with the smaller employers and that the agreement in Pennington therefore might
have been contrary to national labor policy. Justice White thus appears to have believed
that he knew the union's own interests better than it did. See United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
138. Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815, 829 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968). Intent is also stressed in Associated Milk
Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 1970).
139. See Pennington, 257 F. Supp. at 829.
140. Attempting to distinguish which aspects of multi-employer bargaining are exempt
from antitrust and which are part of an illegal conspiracy also adds to the problems.
Even more basic is the question of whether a union is a true union, an employer-run
union, or a group of employers masquerading as a union. See, eg., Scheinholtz and
Kettering, supra note 55, at 357-58.
141. Justice Douglas, speaking for one group, felt the collective bargaining agreement
could itself be prima facie evidence of illegal intent. See United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica, 381 U.S. at 673 (concurring); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 736 (dissenting).
142. In Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100, 421 U.S. 616
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the criteria for antitrust immunity for union multi-employer con-
spiracies clearly offer opportunities for rent-seeking.'43
In Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Adams Dairy, the courts found
no antitrust liability due to the nonexistence of a conspiracy in the
legal sense of the term. However, conspiracy in the legal sense is
not necessary for rent-seeking to raise rivals' costs.' 44 The con-
currence of the interests of larger firms and the natural pressure
of unions to seek higher and uniform wages may be sufficient.'45
A successful economic conspiracy requires an agreement and the
ability to police it. The collective bargaining process and the col-
lective bargaining agreement can provide both of these, even
where an explicit anticompetitive agreement is absent. Strong
unions, then, can use multi-employer bargaining to practice input
predation. Pennington, Jewel Tea and Adams Dairy illustrate that
cases where unions have done so form much of the labor exemp-
tion to the antitrust laws.
Economic theory provides no justification for the byzantine
distinctions that exist in the antitrust law. But economic theory
also cannot distinguish rent-seeking via multi-employer bargaining
from normal collective bargaining (which almost invariably hurts
one employer more than another), especially since unions seldom
practice price discrimination. 46 Economic analysis therefore can-
not cure the ambiguities flowing from the legal principles that
define the boundaries of the labor exemption to the antitrust
statutes. The current law on the labor exemption focuses upon the
(1975), a union sought to compel Connell, whose workers the union did not represent, to
subcontract only to contractors who recognized the plumbers union. The Court denied an
antitrust exemption even though no conspiracy between the Union and employers was al-
leged. Id. at 626-35.
We avoid the temptation to illustrate further the difficult distinctions required by
Connell and by the overlap of the NLRA and the antitrust exemption. One could argu-
ably read Connell as removing the conspiracy requirement and requiring only a direct
restraint on the commercial market to loose antitrust immunity. This case, however, is
extremely difficult to interpret and its precedential value is unclear. In the years since
Connell there have been hundreds of federal court opinions concerned with labor-antitrust
issues, as a quick search of LEXIS or Westlaw demonstrates. Many of these cases have
involved what one may characterize as rent-seeking behavior. We take the prevalence of
these cases as a reflection of both the ubiquity of rent-seeking by employers and unions
and the lack of clarity of the law.
143. See generally Durie & Lemley, supra note 23, at 765-69.
144. See Williamson, supra note 111, at 114; see also cases cited supra note 134.
145. See Williamson, supra note 111, at 114.
146. See id. at 114-15.
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wrong issue-agreement-when it should be concerned with com-
petitive effect.
HI. LESSONS FROM JAPAN
The number of books and articles discussing Japanese man-
agement techniques with an eye to transplanting many of their
ideas to the United States is staggering. Americans understandably
are impressed by Japanese efficiency and like to think the adop-
tion of some of their techniques will aid our own industries. Often
these proposals seem fanciful and fail to recognize the many dif-
ferences between the two countries, their economic systems and
their cultures. Nonetheless, there remains an important aspect of
the Japanese economic system that might well contribute signifi-
cantly to the efficiency of the United States economy that has
received scant attention: the Japanese collective bargaining struc-
ture.
The Japanese collective bargaining system, like that of the
U.S., starts with the goal of worker-management equality. This
stated goal is "to elevate the status of workers ... [to] equal[ize]
standing with their employer[s]."'47 But the Japanese system has
evolved in a dramatically different direction.
In Japan, unions are primarily organized on a plant-wide
basis.' Even different plants within the same company typically
have separate, truly independent unions.49 Unions, or effective
collections of unions, spanning more than one employer are almost
nonexistent; more than 90% of unionized workers in Japan belong
to company-specific "enterprise unions."' ° And, while national
federations of enterprise unions do exist, they are extremely loose-
ly organized, with small staffs,' and only have the power to ad-
vise the enterprise unions on negotiating goals and tactics.
147. MINISTRY OF LABOR, JAPAN LABOUR LAWS 15 (1968).
148. See Linda L. Rippey, Special Project Note, Alternatives to the United States Sys-
tem of Labor Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Sweden, 41 VAND. L. RIV. 627, 640 (1988).
149. See Comment, Japanese Labor Relations and Legal Implication of the Possible
Use in the United States, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 585, 601 n.130 (1983); Rippey, supra
note 148, at 643-46.
150. See Comment, supra note 149, at 600; Rippey, supra note 148, at 640.
151. See William B. Gould, Labor Law 4n Japan and the United States: A Comparative
Perspective, 6 INDUS. REL. L.. 1, 10-12 (1984).
152. See Comment, supra note 149, at 601.
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These federations do provide advice concerning the enterprise
unions' annual "spring offensive" and also engage in political
activity. They are similar to American trade associations. But
there are no organizations in Japan comparable to such American
organizations as the United Auto Workers, the United Steel-
workers, or the International Association of Machinists. A Japa-
nese Ministry of Labor study showed that only 5% of labor nego-
tiations surveyed involved union officials from outside the compa-
ny.l" Compare this to the coordinated activity among constituent
unions comprising typical United States national labor organiza-
tions.
The bottom line is that, in Japan, each enterprise union acts
independently. The U.S. notion that all comparable workers within
an industry should be paid comparable wages is not a significant
concern in Japan. Thus, in Japan competition on the basis of labor
rates has not been eliminated. 5
The Japanese system can be explained better by sociology
than by government regulation. It evolved in part from the pater-
nalistic attitude of Japanese employers towards their workers, and
the sense of obligation and loyalty on the part of Japanese work-
ers towards their companies. 6 It is part of the same ethic which
produces exceptionally hard workers who take pride in the quality
of their teamwork, their ultimate products and services, and the
reputation of their company. It grew out of a system where the
employer takes a great deal of interest in the "non-business" as-
pects of employees' lives-ffirms are much more likely to play a
role in securing employee housing, or schooling for employees'
children, or to arrange company social events, than are U.S. com-
panies. 7 This has led to a close relationship between labor and
management and a desire on both sides to avoid labor strife."'
And, of course, major employers typically offer lifetime security to
permanent employees. 9 For all these reasons, Japanese employ-
153. See id. at 601 n.132; see also Gould, supra note 151, at 10-12.
154. See Gould, supra note 151, at 10.
155. See id. at 5.
156. See id. at 6; Rippey, supra note 148, at 643, 646; see also Yoichiro Hamabe,
Inadvertent Support of Traditional Employment Practices: Impediments To The Internation-
alization of Japanese Employment Law, 12 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 306, 306-08 (1994).
157. See MASANORI HASHIMOTO, THE JAPANESE LABOR MARKET IN A COMPARA-
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ees generally think in terms of movement within a company rather
than movement between companies. All this interacts to focus
workers' attention on their company rather than upon their trade.
A worker at Toyota or Honda tends to identify himself or herself
as an employee of that company, rather than as an auto worker or
a member of the Japanese equivalent of the United Auto Work-
ers.1
60
The Japanese system of plant-wide or company-wide unions
undoubtedly gives rise to the many types of benefits described in
Section II.A of this Article. For example, such unions may be able
to prevent opportunistic behavior by employees or their employer,
provide credibility for long-term contracts, and prevent public
goods problems and free rider problems. In addition, a plant-wide
or company-wide union may become more attuned and responsive
to the particular needs of its plant or company.' This can help
the employer, both directly and indirectly, by further cementing
workers' loyalties to their company.
The Japanese system is not, however, without deficiencies.
Many unions in Japan are unduly weak, ineffective and dominated
by management. They typically have meager strike funds and their
leaders often lack organization or negotiation skills."6 In short,
even though Japanese unions are coextensive with their employer's
plant or company, they may not be able to achieve equality with
management in terms of effective bargaining power.
We emphasize that we are not proposing that the United
States adopt the Japanese system. Our proposal would, in fact,
permit mergers or cooperation between modestly sized horizontal-
ly-competing unions, and virtually any vertical or horizontal ar-
rangement between non-competing unions. Any absolute size
thresholds for effective union management, negotiating ability,
organizing experience, or financial strength, would be obtainable
through small horizontal, and any vertical or conglomerate union
mergers or cooperative agreement." Such mergers or other ar-
160. See Gould, supra note 151, at 5, 7-8; Comment, supra note 149, at 594-602. See
generally Rippey, supra note 148, at 643-46.
161. See Gould, supra note 151, at 12.
162. See Comment, supra note 149, at 602-03; see also Rippey, supra note 148, at
640-46 (explaining the social and cultural reasons why Japanese organized labor retains a
structure which is fragmented and docile by U.S. standards).
163. Small unions in different industries could merge until they possessed the neces-
sary economies of scale. See infra note 165-66.
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rangements would also allow unions to pool their resources for
political activities.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SUBJECTING UNIONS TO THE MERGER
LAWS: ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR UNION MERGERS
In Part I we concluded that Congress' principal goal in ex-
empting most union behavior from the antitrust laws was to equal-
ize the bargaining ability of labor and capital. This goal roughly
evinces a desire to protect workers' rents from acquisition by
monopsonistic or opportunistic employers. In Part II we discussed
some of the economic effects of the existing form of the labor
exemption, focusing on rent protection, rent-seeking behavior, and
other efficiency and wealth transfer (from consumers to union
members) consequences. In this Part we discuss the possibility of
subjecting unions to the merger laws-a proposal that very well
might successfully carry out society's basic goals in this area more
efficiently, with fewer harmful side effects, and in a manner that
would be in workers' and consumers' long-run best interests.
This proposal would allow the employees of any company to
form a union." This, alone, should generally allow workers to
preserve their rents from being acquired by opportunistic or mo-
nopsonistic employers. It would likely also allow many or all of
the efficiencies arising from unionization. But it likely would not
significantly allow unions to engage in rent-seeking behavior or to
become industry-wide monopolists.
The essence of this Article's proposal is to treat unions and
corporations equally under the antitrust laws. For both, the policy
would generally permit mergers, except when the anticompetitive
potential was likely to outweigh the procompetitive benefits.165
Our proposal would permit every conglomerate union merger,
164. Of course, all of a firm's workers should be allowed to unionize, no matter how
large that firm is. We would not define this as a merger.
165. The normal antitrust rules against conspiracies in restraint of trade between cor-
porations should also apply to conspiracies between unions. Similarly, just as two or more
corporations can often undertake joint ventures without violating the antitrust laws, we
would often permit unions to form joint ventures, particularly those directed toward re-
search. For example, we would generally permit some or all of the unions in an industry
to form a joint venture to research ways to improve worker safety. We would not, of
course, permit unions to enter a "joint venture" to achieve identical wages. For a cogent
analysis of the law and economics of joint ventures, see Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ven-
tures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1523-38 (1982).
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every vertical union merger,' 66 and most-but not all-horizontal
union mergers.167
In theory, one should analyze contemplated mergers between
unions by balancing the harmful effects likely to arise from a
given union merger against any efficiencies so arising. This meth-
odology is the same type of Williamsonian tradeoff analysis that is
widely regarded as being appropriate for corporate mergers.'
And, just as antitrust law makes the controversial presumption
that implicit or explicit coordination between firms is more likely
as industry concentration rises, 69 we would presume that a more
concentrated labor market (that is, a market consisting of few
unions within the same industry) would be more able to coordi-
nate its actions.'70
Even if legally prevented from merging, unions might never-
theless want to act jointly to secure wages or working conditions.
This joint activity could consist of normal oligopolistic interdepen-
dence' or outright horizontal conspiracies (with or without writ-
ten agreements) that could be in restraint of trade. We might
expect collusive activity, especially during a transition period, given
unions' established patterns of behavior. Once impacted by a stan-
dard they would undoubtedly consider unfair, conspiracy might be
166. Vertical mergers can give rise to anticompetitive behavior, although such effects
are likely to be relatively uncommon. See Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 36, at 71. For
simplicity and predictability, however, it would be desirable to allow every vertical union
merger despite the small probability that on a rare occasion one could cause an
anticompetitive effect.
167. Gideon Chitayat's comprehensive study of labor union mergers found that from
1956, the time of the merger of the AFL and the CIO, to 1978, 57 mergers of national
labor unions occurred. See CHmTAYAT, supra note 6, at 1. Fifteen national unions (out of
the top 30) were involved in 25 out of 41 mergers that combined large unions with small
ones. See id. at 129. Although we have not attempted to analyze these 57 mergers in any
detail, most appear to be conglomerate mergers or the merger of a large union and a
much smaller one. See also id. at 1, 128, 143-51.
168. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-
offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968), for the origin of Williamsonian merger analysis. For
a comprehensive discussion of the topic, see generally Fisher & Lande, supra note 36.
169. For a review of the evidence concerning the validity of this assumption, see Paul
A. Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis For Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy,
28 ANTITRUST BuLL 571, 587-684 (1983).
170. If we ever reversed this presumption for firms, and allowed all corporate merg-
ers, we would equalize the bargaining position of labor by giving it the same freedom.
171. For an excellent summary of the legal standards in this area, see Donald S.
Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices after
Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. REV. 887, 908-18 (1983).
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a natural reaction. We would govern such activity by unions
and employers by normal antitrust principles. Such activity would
be illegal if it significantly restrained trade, and cases in this area
often would be difficult.'72 Moreover, unions would still be able
to observe each others' behavior and act interdependently. One
employer would be reluctant to give in to wage demands unless it
knew that its rivals would also do so,' so both employers and
unions would have an incentive to behave like normal corporate
oligopolists.1
74
We therefore recognize that our proposal would not lead to
perfect wage competition in every industry.' However, we cer-
tainly hope that it would often improve competition among work-
ers. This competition should decrease wage rates somewhat and
improve economic efficiency, so it should ultimately lead to lower
prices for consumers.
We also note that competition within an industry among un-
ions, and among union leaders, could be desirable.1 76  Unions
(and union leaders) would compete for members. This competition
would cause unions to convince workers that it could secure the
best benefits and working conditions for its members, thereby
possibly weeding out inefficient unions or corrupt union leaders
who pay themselves too much, take bribes, or "sell out" to man-
agement.
In the short run a major disadvantage of our proposal is that
it would constitute a shock to existing holders of rights to form
unions unrestricted in size and coverage. It is harder to take
172. Oligopolistic interdependence among firms under the existing legal standards
creates antitrust problems because it can lead to imperfect competition and price leader-
ship.
173. See PHILLip AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 5 ANTrrRUsT LAW 166-68 (1980).
174. We would expect "price leadership," which is similar to the labor law concept of
"pattern bargaining."
175. One interesting question concerns "most favored nation" clauses, upon which
employers frequently insist. Just as such clauses in contracts between buying and selling
firms create difficult antitrust problems, see Clark, supra note 171, at 932-34, so would
they in a union-employer context.
176. Preventing such competition has sometimes been a significant factor explaining
union mergers.
In some cases, rivalry and competition significantly motivate larger unions to
merge with unions having the same jurisdictional lines . . . .The major motive
of the Teamsters in its merger with the Brewery Union and of the Steelworkers
in its merger with the Mine Mill union was to eliminate competition within the
labor movement.
CHTAYAT, supra note 6, at 130-31.
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something away than never to grant it in the first place 77 -our
proposal would likely have a negative effect on worker morale
and productivity in the short run. 8
In the long run the effect on worker morale should be posi-
tive. This is true practically by definition. Unions increase produc-
tivity essentially by making the workplace better and by making
workers happier. Our proposal will tend to increase union mem-
bership insofar as it will lower employer opposition. Lower opposi-
tion would appear to be a consequence of the productivity-enhanc-
ing effect of unions coupled with the reduction of their monopoly
power. To argue that unions exist only to exploit monopoly power
ignores their productivity-enhancing aspect. There is in fact no
reason to believe the incentives of workers to form unions would
be inappropriate absent monopoly power. Greater productivity
created by unions will cause an upward shift in the demand for
labor, and as long as the supply of labor is not completely elastic,
will result in higher wages. If unions can create higher wages there
will be an incentive to form unions.
In this Article we do not dispute that unions often give rise
to substantial efficiencies.'79 A crucial question, however, is
whether the efficiencies created by unions would be largely or
entirely realized if all the workers of a firm were allowed to form
a union, but some horizontal mergers and coordinated activity
between unions were restricted. Our survey of the literature found
few if any significant multi-employer union efficiencies that cannot
be obtained through small horizontal union mergers, or through
vertical or conglomerate union mergers. If few significant efficien-
cies-not bargaining advantages, but true efficiencies-arise from
industry-wide collective bargaining, this Article's proposal is war-
ranted.' °
177. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASIRATIONAL ECONOMICS 146-47, 179-80 (1991).
178. Worker morale forms the basis of a justification for Congress' treatment of labor
markets as distinct from product markets, according to the general counsel of the AFL-
CIO: "the refusal to talk about the opportunity price of human labor when the labor
market is the last resort and society's disdain for suicide as a way of dealing with eco-
nomic adversity are not all that difficult to grasp." Laurence Gold, The Antitrust Exemp-
tion for Joint Employee Activity, 21 Duo. L. REv. 343, 343-44 (1983)
179. For a discussion of efficiencies from unions, see supra Section II.A.
180. Even if efficiencies from industry-wide collective bargaining are significant, they
could potentially be outweighed by the monopoly and rent-seeking effects noted in Part
II. Additional monopoly power would be justified on efficiency grounds only as long as
the marginal loss due to monopoly was less than the marginal efficiency gain.
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We have not thus far uncovered significant worker rents
which could not be protected, or union efficiencies which could
not be achieved, by firm-wide unions, or by relatively small merg-
ers of unions within an industry, or by vertical or conglomerate
union mergers. We have found no evidence, in other words, that
union monopoly power is necessary to induce the positive benefits
often associated with unionization. This is especially true since the
permitted mergers would allow unions to reach any absolute size
thresholds for effective union management, general experience and
negotiating expertise, organization, and financial strength. 81
Assuming that unions provide both efficiencies and market
power effects, we would resolve a tradeoff by developing a set of
merger guidelines for unions." As the result of a normal
Williamsonian merger analysis, and following the Merger Guide-
lines for corporations, virtually every horizontal corporate merger
up to specified market share increases is allowed."8' Perhaps the
simplest way to resolve the trade-off for unions is to use these
same standards for union mergers as well. ' However, the Merg-
181. For example, unions in different industries would usually be permitted to pool
their financial resources to enable individual unions to sustain and publicize strikes. Verti-
cal and conglomerate mergers are virtually certain to arise and help unions achieve scale
economies. Such mergers are a large part of our answer to anyone who believes that our
proposal might largely destroy unions' strength.
182. The raison d'etre of guidelines is to give businessman predictability and certainty,
and to protect them from arbitrary or politically motivated governmental action. See
Fisher & Lande, supra note 36, at 1654-56; Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 36, at 77-84.
183. This is not completely true, of course. The 1992 Merger Guidelines are less clear
than one would have liked. Their introduction stresses that the Department will decide
whether to challenge each merger on the basis of specific industry facts and that the
guidelines are not a set of rigid mathematical formulas. The basic methodology for ap-
plying the Guideline's analysis is: 1) to define the relevant product and geographical
markets; 2) calculate the concentration level within that market and increase in concen-
tration due to the merger, and 3) determine the effect of a large number of factors (or
potential defenses) that will make the Antitrust division more or less likely to sue.
For each relevant product and geographic market the Department will calculate the
postmerger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) level and increase. If the postmerger HFI
level is less than 1,000, the department ordinarily will not challenge the merger. Further
if the HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 and the HiHI increase is less than 100, the De-
partment is "unlikely" to challenge the merger. By contrast, if the postmerger HHI is
over 1,800 and the HHI increase is over 50, the merger "potentially raise[s] significant
competitive concerns," and if the postmerger HIF is over 1,800 and the HHI increase is
more than 100, the Guidelines make a rebuttable presumption that the merger will "cre-
ate or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise." MERGER GUIDELNES, supra note
5, at 15-16. For a more detailed explanation of the methodology underlying the Merger
Guidelines, see Pautler, supra note 169, at 597-684.
184. One might make a de minimis exception for industries with less than a specified
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er Guideline thresholds for corporate mergers are lower than eco-
nomic analysis might indicate, due to a large number of factors,
including the incipiency mandate in the law-a Type I, Type II
error tradeoff1" that Congress wanted to resolve on the side of
preventing questionable mergers. 86 Since the labor exception ar-
ea does not contain a congressional incipiency mandate,'17 this
could imply a higher guideline level for union mergers. Neverthe-
less, since society's prime objective in this area is achieving bar-
gaining equality between labor and capital, it might be more ap-
propriate to use the same standards that are used for corporate
mergers. First, it would make our proposal more politically tenable
since subjecting unions and corporations to the same merger
guidelines appears fair. Second, since the merger guidelines are
well-regarded 88 and well-thought-out, there is no reason to think
they can be improved upon in developing something quite differ-
ent for unions.
It is difficult to know whether there should be an efficiencies
defense for union mergers that exceed our prospective guidelines'
thresholds. The issue-like the issue of an efficiencies defense for
corporate mergers'8-is complex and controversial. Although a
full analysis of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article,"9
our inclination is that such a defense is likely to be unwise. In the
number of workers. For such industries, we might presume that inefficiencies caused by
industry-wide unions were unlikely to be substantial, while industry-wide economies of
scale might be significant and that the entire industry's workers should be allowed to
unionize. Further, the union merger guidelines would have to define its terms very care-
fully. When calculating union market shares, for example, it would have to decide wheth-
er to count all of the workers at an open shop operation receiving benefits from the
existence of the union, or only the union's members.
185. For description of the Type I, Type II tradeoff framework, see Fisher & Lande,
supra note 36, at 1670-71.
186. See id. at 1592.
187. We would also have to give appropriate weight to Congress' concern with
workers' freedom of contract, perhaps by resolving otherwise close questions on the side
of allowing union mergers.
188. See Alan A. Fisher et al., Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide
Guidance?, 32 ANT UST BuLL. 609, 641 (1987) (demonstrating that "courts routinely
discuss the DOJ Guidelines in merger decisions").
189. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 36, at 1596-98.
190. The work on an efficiencies defense by Alan Fisher and his colleagues totals 168
law review pages; this total includes neither all of the published work on the subject by
Fisher nor the work of dozens of additional learned scholars. For citations to additional
work by Fisher and others, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 35; Fisher & Sciacca, supra
note 36.
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output market, normally it is desirable for the most efficient man-
ufacturer of a product to expand its market share by gradually
taking away market share from its competitors, even if so doing
will eventually give it 100% of the market. 91 However, one
should only allow a union already at the upper limit of the union
merger guidelines to add market share as its companies growth
through internal growth. Otherwise a very efficient union could
absorb less efficient unions and eventually unionize an entire in-
dustry, resulting in the problems discussed earlier."
One significant problem could arise from this Article's ap-
proach: it would require evaluating mergers between corporations
in terms of both corporate and union market shares (and other
factors).'9 3 Suppose, for example, that two firms wanted to
merge, and that each had 5% of an unconcentrated market. The
antitrust authorities would normally allow such a merger. But
suppose that their employees belonged to different unions, each of
which had 15% of the workers in that market. The enforcers
could avoid letting the unions merge to control 30% of the indus-
try by several different methods.
First, we could require the workers of the combined company
to join whichever of the two unions had the smaller market
share. 4 Although this solution could still cause the union merg-
er guidelines to be violated somewhat, such violations might not
be too substantial. If the union merger concentration thresholds
were set equal to the present corporate merger thresholds this
solution would not usually95 produce inordinately large un-
ions"'96 and this option might be optimal. If, however, the union
191. The exception is for predation. See Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper,
An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L.
REv. 655, 666-72 (1982).
192. Of course, a more efficient union could also benefit its companies, thus helping
them to grow, which would in turn help the union to add members.
193. For some of the union issues that arise from corporate mergers, see Jonni Walls,
Comment, Airline Mergers, Acquisitions and Bankruptcies: Will The Collective Bargaining
Agreement Survive?, 56 1. AIR L. & COM. 847, 850-75 (1991).
194. Of course, these workers should also have the option of forming their own sepa-
rate union.
195. The potential market share of a union would be very much greater where, in a
corporate merger in which different unions were also involved, the workers could choose
among the involved unions, than where the workers were constrained to choose the
smaller of the unions involved or form new unions.
196. Of course, if a firm with a 10% market share had to face a union with a 40%
market share it might be somewhat reluctant to undertake a merger that would cause
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merger guidelines were substantially more lax than the corporate
merger guidelines (e.g., if unions were normally permitted to
merge up to 33% of a market), then this option could permit the
formation of unduly large unions.
Second, we could require the unions to split or reform on
their own in any way that ensured that the unions did not exceed
the Union Merger Guidelines. This would be an extremely disrup-
tive solution, often requiring many workers to change unions. But
it would have the advantages of flexibility and maximum control
for workers over the format of their unions.
A third possibility would be to allow only those corporate
mergers that would not result in violations of the union merger
guidelines. This solution could, however, have the unfortunate
effect of depriving society of the benefits of many efficiency-en-
hancing corporate mergers. Moreover, it violates the spirit of ac-
commodative antitrust-"fix" a merger and allow the unobjection-
able parts of the merger to go through.
A final alternative, contrary to what we earlier proposed,
would be not to allow any significant horizontal union mergers but
to continue to allow vertical and conglomerate union mergers."
Although this solution has the advantage of being clear and pre-
dictable, we believe that it is more drastic than needed and might
unduly sacrifice union economies of scale and other strengths. 8
CONCLUSION
Organized labor finds itself at a historic crossroads. Its overall
strength is at a modern low, having fallen from 33.2% of the
workforce in 1955 to 15.5% today.'99 It has, however, formulated
a three-front strategy to assure that this trend does not continue.
First, the AFL-CIO, in its only openly contested election, recently
opted for a militant new President, John J. Sweeney.m Sweeney
this bargaining imbalance.
197. Workers employed by one company as a result of corporate mergers would of
course be permitted to band into one union. Every vertical and conglomerate union
merger would also be permitted.
198. One commentator warns that a total ban on union mergers could produce unduly
weak, atomistic unions. See Meltzer, supra note 18, at 710-11. Our proposal, by contrast,
which would allow many horizontal, and all vertical and conglomerate union mergers,
would not suffer from this defect.
199. See George F. Will, 'Arise Ye Prisoners . . . ', NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 1995, at 98.
200. See Frank Swoboda, AFL-CIO Elects New Leadership, WASH. PosT, Oct. 26,
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has vowed to bring the same confrontational tactics to the bar-
gaining table that he used with success while heading the Services
Employees International Union."' To achieve his goals, Sweeney
has threatened civil disobedience and the use of other unconven-
tional tactics to implement a "massive campaign of resistance and
retribution."' Organized labor's efforts in the 1996 elections re-
flect this activist approach."t0 Second, the labor movement has
announced that it will make a dramatic push to organize non-
unionized workers. Sweeney, while head of the Services Employ-
ees International Union, nearly doubled its membership despite
the nationwide anti-labor trends of recent years,' and has prom-
ised to increase the AFL-CIO training and organizing budget by a
factor of eight. 5 Third, organized labor is undertaking a wave
of union mergers unprecedented in scope.
These mergers might be an attempt by organized labor to re-
capture a declining monopoly strength through merger. To the
extent that the attempt is successful, such mergers will often not
be in the public interest. Alternatively, most or all of these merg-
ers might arise from legitimate motives, such as a desire to
1995, at Al.
201. See Ud; see also Steven Greenhouse, Man in the News: John Joseph Sweeney;
New Fire For Labor, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1995, at Al (holding that Sweeney leadership
style will" be more aggressive and confrontational); Frank Swoboda, Militants Shaking Up
Labor's Ranks, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 1995, at Al, A12 ("It is Sweeney's union that has
resorted to acts of civil disobedience to dramatize the cause of its members, most recent-
ly blocking traffic on Washington's Roosevelt Bridge during morning rush hour on Sept.
20 in support of efforts to organize janitors in the District of Columbia.").
202. Greenhouse, supra note 201, at Al (internal quotation omitted). Several months
before assuming his new duties, Sweeney told the Los Angeles County Board of Supervi-
sors "if 18,000 workers were laid off, his union, the Service Employees International
Union, would conduct 'a massive campaign of resistance and retribution.' Some 3,000
SEIU members made a show of strength outside, and 20 were arrested for blocking
traffic." Carl Horowitz, New Militancy at the AFL-CIO?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, INC.,
Nov. 14, 1995, at Al. Joining Sweeney's leadership team is United Mine Workers Presi-
dent Richard Trumka, the AFL-CIO's new secretary-treasurer "Trumka is blunt about
the need for bruising, leg-breaking tactics, and has employed them in coal strikes. His
rise gives a green light to intimidation." Id.
203. See Steven Greenhouse, Despite Setbacks, Labor Chief is Upbeat over Election
Role, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al.
204. See Stanley Holmes, AFL-CIO Chief Flexes Labor's Muscles, SEATr=E TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1995, at C1, C3; Greenhouse, supra note 201, at A12.
205. Horowitz, supra note 202, at Al; see also Frank Swoboda, Labor Wants Political
Focus on Wages, WASH. PoST, Dec. 16, 1995, at A20 (noting that Sweeney advocates an
increase in the training and organizing budget from approximately 5% of unions' total
budget to 33%).
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achieve minimum efficient scale or any of the other reasons dis-
cussed in Section II.A. Even if the motives behind union mergers
are entirely legitimate, however, these mergers may have anti-
competitive effects.
The classic way to separate anticompetitive corporate mergers
from benign or procompetitive ones is, of course, to use an anti-
trust analysis to conduct a case-by-case review. This Article pro-
poses that union mergers be reviewed in the same way. Such re-
view could substantially fulfill the societal goals underlying the
current labor exemption, and fulfill them more efficiently. Our
proposal would treat worker and business combinations equally,
which could make consumers and society as a whole better off; it
might preserve the rent-protection and efficiency-enhancing aspects
of unions while diminishing their monopoly and rent-seeking as-
pects.20 '
This may seem to some a strange proposal in a time when
union strength is waning. We believe it is not. Instead, our pro-
posal has the potential to strengthen unions and the union move-
ment. With the unchecked threat of monopoly removed, unions
would be perceived primarily in relation to their ability to con-
tribute to workplace productivity. The application of antitrust
guidelines to labor union mergers could be a logical step and, as
experience with corporate merger guidelines suggests, one useful
to consumers.2 7
206. We are not suggesting that union mergers usually should be blocked. Nor have
we specifically analyzed the competitive merits or problems that might arise from the re-
cently announced merger between the United Auto Workers, the United Steel Workers,
and the International Association of Machinists.
207. Whether such a proposal would actually be superior to the present system de-
pends upon a host of unanswered, mostly empirical questions. How large must unions be
to protect workers' rents adequately and to generate efficiencies? What would be the
effect of the proposal on some of the relatively unique goals of a labor exemption, such
as promoting worker morale and discouraging violence? Are there any externalities, free
rider problems, or other reasons why this proposal might not adequately protect workers?
Are large horizontal mergers necessary, or can small horizontal mergers, or vertical or
conglomerate union mergers, achieve virtually all of the benefits associated with unioniza-
tion? This Article does not answer the many questions connected with our proposal. The
purpose of this Article is not to answer these questions but to raise them.
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